Abstract. Many stream ciphers are built of a linear sequence generator and a non-linear output function f . There is an abundant literature on (fast) correlation attacks, that use linear approximations of f to attack the cipher. In this paper we explore higher degree approximations, much less studied. We reduce the cryptanalysis of a stream cipher to solving a system of multivariate equations that is overdefined (much more equations than unknowns). We adapt the XL method, introduced at Eurocrypt 2000 for overdefined quadratic systems, to solving equations of higher degree. Though the exact complexity of XL remains an open problem, there is no doubt that it works perfectly well for such largely overdefined systems as ours, and we confirm this by computer simulations. We show that using XL, it is possible to break stream ciphers that were known to be immune to all previously known attacks. For example, we cryptanalyse the stream cipher Toyocrypt accepted to the second phase of the Japanese government Cryptrec program. Our best attack on Toyocrypt takes 2 92 CPU clocks for a 128-bit cipher. The interesting feature of our XL-based higher degree correlation attacks is, their very loose requirements on the known keystream needed. For example they may work knowing ONLY that the ciphertext is in English.
Introduction
The security of most cryptographic schemes is usually based on impossibility to extract some secret information, given access to some encryption, signature oracles or other derived information. In most useful cases, there is no security in information-theoretic setting: the adversary has usually enough information to uniquely determine the secret (or the ability) he wants to acquire. Moreover the basic problem is always (in a sense) overdefined: the adversary is assumed to have at his disposal, for example, great many plaintext and cipher text pairs, message and signature pairs, etc. He usually has available, much more than the information needed to just determine the secret key. Thus, one might say, most cryptographic security relies on the hardness of largely overdefined problems. In public key cryptography, the problem is addressed by provable security, that will assure that each utilization of the cryptographic scheme does not leak useful information. The security is guaranteed by a hardness of a single difficult problem, and will not degrade with the repetitive use of the scheme. However unfortunately, there is yet very little provable security in secret key cryptography. It is also in secret key cryptography that the problems become most overdefined, due to the amounts of data that are usually encrypted with one single session key. This is especially true for stream ciphers: designed to be extremely fast in hardware, they can encrypt astronomic quantities of data, for example on an optical fiber.
In this paper we consider a popular class of stream ciphers, in which there is a linear part, producing a sequence with a large period (for example one or several LFSRs), and a stateless nonlinear part that produces the output, given the state of the linear part. The security of such stream ciphers have been studied by many authors. In [11] , Golic gives a set of criteria that should be satisfied in order to resist to the known attacks on stream ciphers. For example, a stream cipher should resist to the fast correlation attack [15] , the conditional correlation attack [1] and the inversion attack [11] . In order to resist different types of correlation attacks, many authors focused on proposing boolean functions that will have no good linear approximation and that will be correlation immune with regard to a subset of several input bits, see for example [3] . In this paper we will exploit rather correlation properties with regard to a non-linear low degree multivariate functions that use all of the variables, or in other words, low degree approximations. This kind of correlations has already been studied, see for example in [12, 9] but it seems that their application to cryptographic attacks did not receive sufficient attention.
In this paper we explain that many constructions of stream ciphers directly give an overdefined system of multivariate equations of low degree. Many other can approximated with a good probability by such a system of equations. All this is not completely new, however only recently people became aware of the existence of efficient algorithms for solving some systems of multivariate equations of low degree, see [24, 6, 7] . The XL algorithm, proposed by Courtois, Klimov, Patarin and Shamir [24] , allows to solve overdefined systems of equations much faster than expected. Later, Courtois and Pieprzyk proposed the XSL method [7] , to further improve XL when the equations are sparse. In the same paper [7] , authors propose to use multivariate polynomial equations to attack block ciphers such as AES. Unfortunately, these attacks are, to say the least, heuristic. In this paper we study multivariate algebraic attacks on stream ciphers. Unlike in [7] , our systems of equations will be much more overdefined. We show that in this case it is possible to predict the behaviour of the XL method with precision and confidence.
In this paper, using XL, we introduce a method to exploit (at least in theory) any correlation with a function of any degree, to mount an attack on a class of popular stream ciphers. Moreover we demonstrate that such attacks can be indeed faster than exhaustive search of the key for some real stream ciphers, for example for Toyocrypt.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 and in Appendix A we study the XL algorithm from [24] for solving multivariate quadratic equations, and extend it to equations of higher degree. In Section 3 we apply XL to the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. In Section 4 we discuss the opportunity to use bent functions in stream ciphers. Then in Section 5 we apply our attack to Toyocrypt stream cipher.
The XL Algorithm
In this paper we describe a rather obvious extension of the XL algorithm [24] . Instead of solving a system of m multivariate quadratic equations with n variables of degree d = 2 as in [24] , we consider also higher degree equations, i.e. study the general case d ≥ 2. Let D be the parameter of the XL algorithm. Let l i (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) = 0 be the initial m equations, i = 1 . . . m with n variables x i ∈ GF (2). The XL algorithm consists of multiplying both sides of these equations by products of variables: Definition 2.0.1 (The XL algorithm). Execute the following steps: 1. Multiply: Generate all the products k j=1 x i j · l i with k ≤ D − d, so that the total degree in the x i of these equations is ≤ D. 2. Linearize: Consider each monomial in the x i of degree ≤ D as a new variable and perform Gaussian elimination on the equations obtained in 1. The ordering on the monomials must be such that all the terms containing one variable (say x 1 ) are eliminated last. 3. Get a Simpler Equation: Assume 1 that step 2 yields at least one univariate equation in the powers of x 1 . Solve this equation over the finite field (e.g., with Berlekamp's algorithm). 4. Final step: It should not be necessary to repeat the whole process.
Once the value of x 1 is known, we expect that all the other variables will be obtained from the same linear system.
We expect that to find one solution to the system, the complexity of XL will be essentially the complexity of one single Gaussian reduction in the step 2.
The Necessary Condition for XL to Work
The XL algorithm consists of multiplying the initial m equations l i by all possible monomials of degree up to D − d, so that the total degree of resulting equations is D. Let R be the number of equations generated in XL, and T be the number of all monomials. We have, (the first term is dominant):
The main problem in the XL algorithm is that in practice not all the equations generated are independent. Let F ree be the exact number of equations that are linearly independent in XL. We have F ree ≤ R. We also have necessarily F ree ≤ T .
The main heuristics behind XL is the following: it can be seen that for some D we have always R ≥ T . Then we expect that F ree ≈ T , as obviously it cannot be bigger than T . More precisely, following [24] , when F ree ≥ T − D, it is possible by Gaussian elimination, to obtain one equation in only one variable, and XL will work. Otherwise, we need a bigger D, or an improved algorithm 2 .
The Saturation Problem in XL
The exact value of F ree in XL is somewhat complex to predict. In [24] authors demonstrate that XL works with a series of computer simulations for d = 2 and over GF (127). In [6] authors show that it also works very well for d = 2 and over GF (2). Moreover they explain how to predict the exact number F ree of linearly independent equations in XL. In this paper we extend the study of XL for higher degree equations d > 2 (still over GF (2)), and will also give a formula that allows to compute F ree (see Conjecture A.3.1). This will allow us to say that our (cryptanalytic) applications of XL should work exactly as predicted.
In order to XL algorithm to work, it is sufficient that for some D, the number F ree of linearly independent equations satisfies F ree ≥ T −D. In [19] , Moh states that "From the theory of Hilbert-Serre, we may deduce that the XL program will work for many interesting cases for D large enough". In Section 4 Moh shows a very special example on which the basic version 2 of XL always fails, for any D [19] . This example is very interesting, however it seems that such counter-example does not exist when XL is done over a small finite field, see [13] and [6] .
Remark as in the previous section, we get w ≈ 1. The conclusion of Moh is inappropriate, not to say incorrect.
According to [13] , when D is sufficiently big, we will always have F ree = T − α, with α being the number of solutions to the system 3 . Therefore for systems over GF(2) that have one and unique solution we expect to always achieve F ree = T − 1 > T − D, which is called saturation 4 . In all our simulations we observed that this saturation, necessary to solve the system, is achieved very quickly, and in fact as soon as R > T .
Asymptotic Analysis of XL for Equations of Degree d
We assume that D n. XL algorithm is expected to succeed when R ≥ T , i.e. when
Thus (assuming that D n) we get:
Asymptotically this is expected to be a good evaluation, when m = εn d with a constant ε > 0.
The Complexity of XL and Gaussian Reduction
Let ω be the exponent of the Gaussian reduction. In theory it is at most ω ≤ 2.376, see [4] . However the (neglected) constant factor in this algorithm is expected to be very big. The fastest practical algorithm we are aware of, is Strassen's algorithm that requires about 7 · T log 2 7 operations. Since our basic operations are over GF (2), we expect that a careful bitslice implementation of this algorithm on a modern CPU can handle 64 such operations in one single CPU clock. To summarize, we evaluate the complexity of the Gaussian reduction to be 7/64 · T log 2 7 CPU clocks. 3 Here however one should include also the solutions at infinity. Such solutions do not exist when the equations of the field x 2 i = xi are included in XL, see [6] and [13] . 4 It is easy to show that F ree = T is impossible for a system that has a solution, and more generally if α is the number of solutions (including points at infinity, see the footnote 3), one always has F ree ≤ T − α in XL, cf. [13] .
The Exact Behaviour of XL for Interesting Cases d ≥ 2. In this paper we do not use any of the estimations given above. We study the exact behaviour of XL, and compute the exact values of F ree for the interesting values of d and D. This part is in Appendix A.
Application of XL to Stream Ciphers
In this part we outline a general strategy to apply XL in cryptanalysis of a general class of stream ciphers. Later we will apply it to Toyocrypt.
The Stream Ciphers that May be Attacked
We consider only synchronous stream ciphers, in which each state is generated from the previous state independently of the plaintext, see for example [17] . We consider regularly clocked stream ciphers, and also (it makes no difference) stream ciphers that are clocked in a known way 5 .
For simplicity we restrict to binary stream ciphers in which the state and keystream are composed of a sequence of bits b i . Let L be the "connection function" that computes the next state. We restrict to the (very popular) case of cipher with linear feedback, i.e. when L is linear over GF (2). We assume that L is public, and only the state is secret. We also assume that the function f that computes the output bit from the state is public and does not depend on the secret key of the cipher. The only no-linear component of the cipher is f and this way of building stream ciphers is sometimes called "nonlinear filtering". It includes the very popular filter generator, in which the state of a single LFSR 6 is transformed by a boolean function, and also not less popular scenarios, in which outputs of several LFSR are combined by a boolean function (combinatorial function generators or nonlinear function generators).
The problem of cryptanalysis of such a stream cipher can be described as follows. Let (k 0 , . . . , k n−1 ) be the initial state, then the output of the cipher (i.e. the keystream) is given by:
. . .
The problem we consider 7 is to recover (k 0 , . . . , k n−1 ) given some b i .
The Attack Scenario
We are going to design a partially known plaintext attack, i.e. we know some bits of the plaintext, and the corresponding ciphertext bits. These bits does not need to be consecutive. For example if the plaintext is written with latin alphabet and does not use too much special characters, it is very likely that all the characters have their most significant bit equal to 0. This will be enough for us, if the text is sufficiently long. In our later attacks we just assume that we have some m bits of the keystream at some known positions:
Remark: Even if no bit of plaintext is known, there are many cases in which our attack can be extended. For example if the plaintext contains parity bits.
Criteria on the Function f
Let f be the boolean function 8 that is used to combine the bits of the linear part of a stream cipher (the entries of the function are for example some bits of the state of some LFSRs). There are many design criteria known on boolean functions. For example f should be balanced and have high algebraic degree. In order to resist different types of correlation attacks, many authors focused on proposing boolean functions that will have no good linear approximation and that will be correlation immune with regard to a subset of several input bits, see for example [3] . In this paper we will exploit rather correlation properties with regard to a nonlinear low degree multivariate functions that use all of the variables, or in other words, low degree approximations. This kind of correlations has already been studied, see for example in [12, 9] but it seems that their application to cryptographic attacks did not receive sufficient attention.
Our attack works in two cases:
S1 When the boolean function f has a low algebraic degree d. S2 When f can be approximated 9 with good probability, by a function g that has a low algebraic degree d.
More precisely, we assume that:
., s n−1 ) holds: 1. with probability ≥ 1 − ε 2. and with g of degree d.
Note: In the first scenario S1, when f has just a low algebraic degree, it is known that the system can be easily broken given n d keystream bits. A successful example of this attack is described for example in [2] . In this paper we show that, since in S2, we do not need for the function to have a low algebraic degree (S1), successful attacks can be mounted given much less keystream bits, and with much smaller complexities. For example in Toyocrypt the degree of f is 63, but in our attacks, it will be approximated by a function of degree 2 or 4.
The Actual Attack
We recall that f , and all the L t i are public, and only the k j are secret 10 . Each of the keystream bits gives one multivariate equation of degree d, with n variables (k 0 , .., k n−1 ) and being true with probability (1 − ε):
, we may assume that all these equations are true and we have to find a solution to our system of m multivariate equations of degree d with n variables. More generally, even if (1−ε) m < 1 2 , the attack still works, if we repeat it about (1−ε) −m times, each time for a different subset of m keystream bits, and until it succeeds. The complexity of this attack will be the complexity of generalized XL obtained in Section 2.2, multiplied by the number of repetitions necessary to succeed:
The above attack requires about m keystream bits, out of which we choose m at each iteration of the attack. We also need to choose m that minimizes the complexity given above. In practice, since the XL algorithm complexity increases increases by big leaps, with the value of D, we will in fact choose D and determine a minimal m for which the attack works.
Non-linear Filtering using Bent Functions
In order to prevent the numerous known fast correlation attacks, ciphers such as we described above (for example filter generators) should use a function f that is highly non-linear. For this, Meier and Staffelbach suggested at Eurocrypt'89 to use so called perfect non-linear functions, also known as "bent functions" [16, 22] . These functions achieve optimal resistance to the correlation attacks, because they have a minimum (possible) correlation to all affine functions, see Theorem 3.5. in [16] . It is therefore tempting to use a bent function as a combiner in a stream cipher. And indeed many cryptographic designs (e.g. Toyocrypt, and not only in stream ciphers) use such functions, or modified versions of such functions 11 . Unfortunately optimality against one attack does not guarantee the security against other attacks. Following Anderson [1] , any criteria on f itself cannot be sufficient. The author of [1] claims that "attacking a filter generator using a bent or almost bent function would be easy" and shows why on small examples. He considers "an augmented function" that consists of α copies of the function f applied to consecutive windows of n consecutive bits, among the n + α consecutive bits of an LFSR output stream. He shows explicit examples in which even if f : GF (2) n → GF (2) is a bent function, still the augmented function GF (2) n+α → GF (2) α will have very poor statistic properties, and thus will be cryptographically weak.
For real ciphers, it is difficult to see if Anderson's remark is really dangerous. For example in Toyocrypt, an MLFSR is used instead of an LFSR, which greatly decreases the number of common bits between two consecutive states, and more importantly, only a carefully selected subset of state bits is used in each application of f . Thus it seems that Toyocrypt makes any version of the attacks described by Anderson in [1] completely impractical.
Bent Function Used in Toyocrypt
The combining function f of Toyocrypt is built according to:
Theorem 4.0.1 (Rothaus 1976 [22] ). Let g be any boolean function g : GF (2) k → GF (2). All the functions f : GF (2) 2k → GF (2) of the following form are bent:
Remark: More precisely, the function of Toyocrypt is a XOR of s 127 and a function built according to the above theorem. We must say that using such a function as a non-linear filter is not a very good idea. It is easy to see that if we use a single LFSR or MLFSR, there will be always a "guess and find" attack on such a cipher. This is due to the fact that if we guess and fix k state bits, here it will be the odd-numbered bits, then 11 In general the authors of [16] did not advocate to use pure bent functions, because it is known that these functions are not balanced and cannot have a very high degree. They advise to use modified bent functions, for which it is still possible to guarantee a high non-linearity, see [16] .
the expression of the output becomes linear in the other state bits. This can be used to recover the whole state of the cipher given 3k/2 bits of it, i.e. the effective key length in such a scheme is only 3k/2 instead of 2k bits. This attack is explained in details (on the example of Toyocrypt) in [18] . In this paper we do not use this property of f , and design a different attack, based on the low number of higher degree monomials, and thus being potentially able to break variants of Toyocrypt that are not based on the above theorem and for which there is no "guess and find" attacks.
Application of XL to the Cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt
In this section we present a general attack on Toyocrypt [18] , a cipher that was, at the time of the design, believed to resist to all known attacks on stream ciphers. In Toyocrypt, we have one 128-bit LFSR, and thus n = 128. The boolean function is as follows: with {α 0 , . . . , α 62 } being some permutation of the set {63, . . . , 125}. This system is quite vulnerable to the XL higher order correlation attack we described above: there are only a few higher-order monomials, one of degree 4, one of degree 17 and one of degree 63. Everything else is quadratic.
A Quadratic Approximation
Most of the time, the system is quadratic. We put: g(s 0 , .., s 127 ) = 
An Approximation of Degree d = 4
One can also see that if we put:
Then f (s) = g(s) holds with probability very close to 1 − 2 −17 . We have d = 4 and we have approximatively ε = 2 −17 .
Our Higher Order Correlation Attack on Toyocrypt
The equation (1 − ε) m ≈ 1 2 gives m ≈ 2 16 . This is simply to say that if we consider some 2 16 , not necessarily consecutive bits of the keystream, the probability that for all of them we have f (s) = g(s) will be about 1/2. A more precise evaluation shows that if we put m = 1.3 · 2 16 , we still have (1 − ε) m = 0.52. This is the value we are going to use.
Thus, given some m keystream bits, m = 1.3 · 2 16 , one can write from Toyocrypt m equations of degree 4 and with 128 variables k i . To this system of equations we apply generalized XL as described in Section 2. 
Improved XL Higher Correlation Attacks
We will now explore the tradeoff described in Section 3.4. The basic idea is that, if we diminish a little bit a success probability of the attack, we may use a higher m, the system will be more overdefined and we will be able to use a lower value of D. This in turn greatly diminishes the value of T that may compensate for the necessity to repeat the attack.
Improved Attacks Exploring the Tradeoff
In the attack above we saw that F ree = min(T, R − 
The number of keystream bits required in the attack is about m, and the memory is T 2 bits. In the following Now, our best attack is in 2 96 , requires 2 65 bits of memory and only 82 kilobytes of keystream.
Better Attacks with an Iterated Variant of XL It is possible to improve this attack slightly by iterating the XL algorithm. Here is one possible way to do this. We start with m = 1.6 · 2 18 keystream bits. The probability that all the corresponding m approximations of degree 4 are true is (1 − 1 2 17 ) m ≈ 2 −4.62 . This means that the whole attack should be repeated on average 2 4.62 times. Now we apply the XL algorithm with D = 5, i.e. we multiply each equation by nothing or one of the variables. We have R = 129 · 1.6 · 2 18 . The goal is however not to eliminate most of the terms, but only all the terms that contain one variable k 0 . Let T be the number of terms in T that does not contain the first variable k 0 . We have T = The complexity of the whole attack is: 2 4.62 2 75.5 + 2 87.6 = 2 92.2 CPU clocks. Our best attack is now in 2 92 , it requires still 2 65 bits of memory, and now only 51 kilobytes of keystream.
Comparison with Previously Known Attacks
Our new attack is much better than the generic purpose time/memory/data tradeoff attack described by Shamir and Biryukov in [23] , that given the same number of keystream bits, about 2 19 , will require about 2 109 computations (in pre-computation phase).
Our attack is sometimes better, and sometimes worse than the Mihaljevic and Imai attack from [18] . In [18] , given much more data, for example 2 48 bits, and in particular at least some 32 consecutive bits of the keystream, and given the same quantity of memory 2 64 , the key can be recovered with a pre-computation of 2 80 and processing time 2 32 .
However if the keystream available does not contain 32 consecutive bits, only our attack will work. Similarly, if the keystream available is limited to 2 19 bits, both the Mihaljevic and Imai attack [18] and the generic tradeoff attack from [23] will require a pre-computation of about 2 109 . In this case our attack in 2 92 is better.
Extensions and Generalizations
Improved Elimination Methods. A careful implementation of our attack could be substantially faster. It is possible that there are more careful elimination algorithms, that generate the equations in a specific order and eliminate monomials progressively, so that they are not generated anymore. We also expect that fast Gröbner bases algorithms such as Faugère's F5/2 [8] would improve our attack, at least in practice.
Variants of Toyocrypt. Our XL-based attacks can cryptanalyse not only Toyocrypt but also many variants of Toyocrypt that resist to all known attacks. For example, if in Toyocrypt we replace the bilinear part of f by a random quadratic form, such "guess-and-find" attacks as in [18] are not possible anymore, still our XL-based higher degree correlation attack works all the same. The same is true when we leave the quadratic part unchanged and add to f some terms of degree 3 and 4 in variables x 2 , x 4 , . . .. It is also possible to see that, if the positions of the known bits of the keystream are sparsely distributed, and we do not have any known 32 consecutive bits, the attacks from [18] will not work anymore, and our attack still works.
New Attack Scenarios S3 and S4. Since this paper was written, there was substantial progress in algebraic attacks on stream ciphers. Generalizing the attack scenarios S1 and S2 described in this paper, two new attack scenarios S3 and S4 have been introduced by Courtois and Meier [5] . The principle of these new attacks is (roughly) to generate new multivariate equations of substantially lower degree than the original ones, by multiplying the equations by well-chosen multivariate polynomials. Thus, the authors are able to break Toyocrypt in 2 49 CPU clocks instead of 2 92 , and also present an attack in 2 57 for LILI-128.
Conclusion
In this paper we studied higher order correlation attacks on stream ciphers. Our approach is to reduce the problem of recovering the (initial) state of a cipher, to solving an overdefined system of multivariate equations. We studied the Toyocrypt stream cipher, accepted to the second phase of the Japanese government Cryptrec call for cryptographic primitives. It is a 128-bit stream cipher, and at the time of submission of Toyocrypt, it was claimed to resist to all known attacks on stream ciphers. The weakness of Toyocrypt we exploited here is the presence of only a few higher degree monomials. It has already been identified as dangerous in Rueppel's book [21] , page 79, back in 1986, however the designers of Toyocrypt ignored this warning.
Having little higher degree monomials, it is possible to approximate the filtering function, by a function of a much lower degree with a good probability. From this we were able to reduce the cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt to solving a system of multivariate equations of degree 4. In order to solve it, we studied an extension of the XL algorithm proposed at Eurocrypt 2000 for the case of quadratic equations [24] . The problem about XL is that it is heuristic, not all equations that appear in XL are linearly independent, and thus it is somewhat difficult to say to what extent is works. In this paper we showed that we are always able to explain the origin of the linear dependencies that appear in XL and to predict the exact number of non-redundant equations in XL.
Our best higher order correlation attack on Toyocrypt requires 2 92 CPU clocks for a 128-bit cipher. This is achieved using only 51 kilobytes of the keystream, that does not have to be consecutive, and using 2 65 bits of memory. This attack will work in many scenarios in which all known attacks fail, for example when the plaintext in only partially known.
We conclude that higher order correlation immunity, should be taken more seriously than previously thought, in the design of stream ciphers.
A The Exact Behaviour of XL for d ≥ 2.
Let F ree be the maximum number of equations that are linearly independent in XL algorithm. We will show how to compute F ree exactly and compare the results with computer simulations.
In all the simulations that follow, we pick a random system of linearly independent equations y i = f i (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) of degree ≤ d (nonhomogenous). Then we pick a random input x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) and we modify the constants in the system in order to have a system that gives 0 in x, i.e. we write a system to solve as l i (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) = 0, for i = 1, . . . m. R number of equations generated (independent or not). T number of monomials of degree ≤ D Free number of linearly independent equations among the R equations.
XL will work when F ree ≥ T − D.
Results: For d = 2 and D = 3 we observe that most of the time 12 F ree = min(T, R) and at any rate, we always have F ree = min(T, R) − with = 0, 1, 2 or 3. 
A.3 Tentative Conclusion on XL and More Simulations for
d ≥ 2 and D ≥ 4. From the above simulations, we see that, at least for simple cases, we are always able to predict the exact number of linearly independent equations that will be obtained. From the above simulations we conjecture that:
